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ABSTRACT

INDIFFERENCE
by
John F. Pohorylo Jr.

The main intention of this thesis is to wrestle Derrida's notion of difference from
an endless free-play of signification into some sense of boundedness, and to
release meaning, knowledge and understanding from its relentless grasp. In
achieving this goal, an entirely new field of "value" and "Quality" based discourse
would open up within applied schismatic architectural theory.
Robert Pirsig offers a strong alternative to difference with his discourse on
the Metaphysics of Quality, wherein he defines "Quality" as a pre-intellectual
reality. This pre-intellectual reality, which I call "indifférence", is made up of the
lenses of inorganic, organic and social Quality that effect the intellectual Quality
that ultimately interprets each experience that we encounter. "Indifference" marks
a small fissure in the armour of difference overlooked by Derrida, which defines a
whole new avenue of metaphysical discourse that applied schismatic
architectural theorists can explore further.
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CHAPTER ONE
Foreword
"It is customary to preface a work with an explanation of the author's aim, why he
wrote the (piece), and the relationship in which he believes it to stand to other
earlier or contemporary treatises on the same subject. In the case of a
philosophical work, however, such an explanation seems not only superfluous
but, in view of the nature of the subject matter, even inappropriate or misleading.
For whatever may be said about a philosophy in a preface — say a historical

statement of the main drift and the point of view, the general content and results,
a string of random assertions and assurances about truth — none can be
accepted as the way in which to expound a philosophical truth." [G. W. F. Hegel,
in the opening of Phenomenology of Spirit]

1

2

In coining the term "indifférance", one immediately sights a debt paid to the
French philosopher, literary theorist, and contemporary cultural critic Jacques
Derrida for his work concerning the mechanisms at play in the seminal concept of
"difference". This thesis applauds the post-structuralist genius of Derrida, and at
the same time attempts to turn one of the author's most famous mechanisms, the
analytical fulcrum entitled "Deconstruction", back upon the author's own work.
Derrida has been noted to encourage this sort of subversion/inversion of his work
from time to time in various interviews and articles. In order to accomplish a solid
deconstruction of the godfather of Deconstruction, the work of two other great
minds has been referenced to build an investigative foundation: that of fellow
French scholar Roland Barthes, and the American pop-literary philosopher
Robert M. Pirsig. Barthes has been employed to lend late-structuralist support to
Derrida's theoretical work, while Pirsig has been utilized for his somewhat
isolated conclusions that simultaneously acknowledge the concept of difernc
and open a door for a redefinition of the term itself.
Robert Pirsig's work has been the true inspiration for this thesis, and the
author is probably the least understood of the authors described above.
Therefore, a brief preface is in order to isolate the methodological reasoning for
the use of Pirsig's rather unconventional thoughts in a serious academic exercise
like a Masters Thesis in Architectural Theory and Criticism.
Throughout his main body of work, Robert Pirsig has utilized the idea of
'interchapters' as his primary mode of communication. The 'interchapter',
beautifully employed in texts such as Stienbeck's "The Grapes of Wrath", is
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considered a between' chapter, allowing for a pause or meditation before
continuing with the story line, plot, or philosophical rumination. Originally, the
'interchapter' was considered a 'secondary' chapter, containing lighter
commentary and more iconic imagery than traditional text. Pirsig builds upon this
idea in his books, refraining from distinguishing between primary and secondary
chapters --- permitting an equivalent reading of the more literary, dialogue-based
and technical, philosophically-based portions of his texts. The "digital" format of
this thesis was intended to be an evolution built upon Robert Pirsig's employment
of the 'interchapter' in his work --- where the hypertext elements allow for 'interinter-chapters' of complex valence relations

tNri

Figure 1.1

This thesis was also intended to be a evolutionary "digital" counterpart to
the "analog" computer Pirsig has employed and described in detail in the central
text of this project: Lila: An Inquiry into Morals. Instead of being overly critical
and judgmental of his own ideas, Pirsig describes how he has collected an
incredible body of 'scraps of thought' over the years on 3 x 5 cards and built
Lila... up from the bottom rather than beginning with a clear (yet inevitably
biased) thesis working down from there. The digital arena proved infinitely more
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effective than Pirsig's archaic card-catalog style analog "computer", allowing for
ideas collected throughout time and space to be connected and reconnected into
an elaborate web. Much to my surprise, the closer I came to the end of this
project, the more and more my web became similar to a typical, linear
publication. (This should not have been as much of a surprise as it was, though,
since Pirsig was able to arrive at a fairly coherent linear text from his analog
system.) However, this ultimate similarity to a typical linear text should not
overshadow the incredible complexity and intricacy involved in the design of this
system of intellectual production. Though the process of building this web could
be likened to a bunch of scattered ideas in various notebooks and on scraps of
paper, the "digital" format of this thesis has allowed for a fluidity of arrangement
of these ideas unprecedented in my academic career. I feel that it would not have
been possible for me to arrive at the conclusions I have achieved had I not
attempted to proceeded with thesis in this unorthodox manner.
In addition, there are inherent theoretical reasons for the employment of a
web rather than the typical linear process of hypothesis, deletion, and production.
As a postmodern thinker, semiology is one of many concerns when attempting to
convey meaning. Since there have been considerable shifts in semiological
theory since the time of Saussure, it is necessary to contend with these shifts any
time one attempts to describe or produce cultural artifacts. Of all of the Derridian
scholars that have taken issue with post-structuralist semiology, Mark C. Taylor
has detailed the mechanisms involved in the conveyance of meaning most
succinctly:
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"...the distinction between signifier and signified is actually a product of
consciousness itself. Though not always aware of its own activity,
consciousness attempts to give itself a criterion by which to judge itself. The

which consciousness points is always already within consciousness itself. This
analysis of the relationship between signifier and signified overturns the
traditional understanding of signification. The signified is neither independent of
nor superior to the signifier. To the contrary, the signified is a signifier.
Consciousness, therefore, deals only with signs and never reaches the thing
itself. More precisely, the thing itself is not an independent entity (be it "real" or
"ideal") to which all signs refer but is itself a sign."
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"...The/A word is nothing in itself; it is a play within a play, a play that is
forever an interplay. This play is a play of differences that forms and reforms the
word itself. The specificity of any signifier is a function of its entwinement within
a complex signifying web. This differential network of signs is 'the functional
condition, the condition of possibility, for every sign.' [ref. Derrida01] It's name is
writing." [ref. Taylor01 pp. 524-525]
Lastly, I was inspired by a lesser known essay / story by Jorge Louis
Borges, entitled A New Refutation of Time, wherein the author includes two
versions of the same text from two distinctly different time periods. What is
unique about this approach is that the two versions come to completely different
conclusions, and yet proceed from the same basic premise. By including a
temporal dimension with this text, it becomes much richer with meaning, without
falling into the banality of prescriptive / proscriptive discourse. It is impressive
when an author has enough command of his craft to be able to have the physical
structure of a text reflect its philosophical and intellectual underpinnings, and I
wished to emulate this in my writing.
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As an acknowledgement to the "interplay of differences" in writing, coupled with
the desire for the intellectual structure of this thesis to be reflected within its
physical structure, this "digital" web was born. The original intent was to create
an elaborate labyrinth of ideation, conveying a deeply seated fear of endless
signification to the reader, forcing him or her to come to terms with the realities of
Derridian deconstruction and difference. Due to time constraints and graduation
requirements, and the ultimate conclusions of this thesis, the radical bent of this
project has been diminished. As a tool, the web has been indispensable for
organizing and searching my text and the texts of others, and allows for
immediate publication on the Internet. As a theoretical fulcrum, however, the
web remains in its infancy.
"...hypertext thinks itself to be structural rather than serial thought --thought in space rather than thought for space. 'Serial thought,' says Umberto
Eco, 'aims at the production of history and not at the rediscovery --- beneath
history --- of the atemporal abscissae of all communication' [ref. Joyce01 p.189]
I also must preface the fact that although this is a philosophical endeavor,
references to the numerous philosophers and philosophies of the past are kept to
a minimum. This is in part because the central author that is the basis of this
thesis, Robert Pirsig, has eloquent thoughts on this issue. In Lila: An Inquiry into
Morals he illuminates the difference between philosophologist (as rigorous
student of philosophy) and philosopher (as creator of philosophy):
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"Philosophologists often have an interest in creating philosophy but, as
philosophologists, they subordinate it, much as a literary scholar might
subordinate his own interest in creative writing. Unless they are exceptional they
don't consider the creation of philosophy their real line of work.
As an author, Phaedrus (one of Pirsig's many narrative voices) had been
putting off the philosophology, partly because he didn't like it, and partly to avoid
putting a philosophological cart before the philosophical horse. Philosophologists
not only start by putting the cart first; they usually forget the horse entirely. They
say that first you should read what all the great philosophers of history have said
and then you should decide what you want to say. The catch here is that by the
time you've read what all the great philosophers of history have said you'll be at
least two hundred years old. A second catch is that these great philosophers are
very persuasive people and if you read them innocently you may be carried away
by what they say and never see what they missed.
Phaedrus (Pirsig), in contrast, sometimes forgot the cart but was
fascinated by the horse. He thought the best way to examine the contents of
various carts is to figure out what you believe and then see what great
philosophers agree with you. There will always be a few somewhere. These will
be much more interesting to read since you can cheer what they say and boo
their enemies, and when you see how their enemies attack them you can kibitz a
little and take a real interest in whether they were right or wrong."[ref. Pirsig02
p.323]
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I share Robert Pirsig's thoughts on this issue, not out of ignorance, since I have
read a good portion of the important philosophers in history; as a 'schismatic'
postmodern architectural theorist, I believe that there is a time when we must
proceed into the dark without assistance in order to find a new source of light --without undertaking an aggressive deletion of the enlightenment that has
facilitated our arrival into the darkness.

CHAPTER TWO
Outwork
"Thus we are compelled to follow the circle. This is neither a makeshift nor a
defect. To enter upon its path is the strength of thought, to continue on it is the
feast of thought, assuming that thinking is a craft. Not only is the main step from
work to art a circle like the step from art to work, but every separate step that we
attempt circles in this circle." [ref. Heigegger01]
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2.1 Static and Dynamic Practice and Theory
A basis for intellectualizing about and through architecture was born with the rise
of architectural theory in the post-Renaissance "Humanist" period, born out of
Gothic scholasticism. The earliest theories, such as the Brunelleschian and
Albertian perspectival studies, archaeological reinterpretations of the GrecoRoman orders, and the French Neo-rationalist planometric studies gave rise to
the first 'static' intellectual modeling of architecture. These breakthroughs allowed
previously unseen and uninterpreted information to be communicated between
architects and their apprentices, producing the general discourse of architectural
theory.
In and around the turn of the nineteenth century, new materials such as
concrete and steel were introduced to the realm of architecture that necessitated
a more developed understanding of the science of materials. Based on simple
physics, the study of the properties of these inorganic materials required more of
an investment in time by architects and builders during the design process, but
the results were more efficient ways to create space and an expanded
vocabulary of form for the architect/builder. This shift gave rise to the first mode
of architectural engineering theory: the idealized study of the static nature of
inorganic materials --- "Statics".

Architectural engineering theorists began to realize that there were limitations
involved in the idealizations that a "static" interpretation of a structure after
Statics became fully understood and employed within the building trades and
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buildings became taller and more complex. Statics takes into account only the
information involved in a discrete moment of the existence of a structure; and this
ideal interpretation, although helpful in the initial understanding of Statics, made it
more difficult to envision comprehension tools that lie beyond Statics. Buildings
are not static structures they are affected by "dynamic" loads such as wind,
snow, and earthquakes. Understanding these non-ideal dynamic conditions
required more complex mathematical procedures, which utilized calculus and
differential equations, giving rise to the second mode of architectural engineering
theory: the non-idealized study of the dynamic nature of inorganic materials —
"Dynamics". Dynamics, which takes into account information beyond a discrete
moment of the existence of a building, was no better tool than Statics. But when
Dynamics was used in conjunction with Statics, it allowed for a more complete
picture of the existence and temporal transformations of a structure.
An analogy can be made between this shift in perspective within architectural
engineering and that of general architectural theory during the second half of the
twentieth century. Over the past fifty years there has been a general trend in
architectural theory away from the more "static" nature of "Humanism" and
toward the more "dynamic" nature of "Post-Modernism" . This is exemplified by
projects like the shard-like, anthro-mechanistic drawings of Lebbeus Woods,
Daniel Libeskind's angularly monolithic addition to the Berlin Museum, Peter
Eisenman's crumpled and interstitial Wexler Art Center, Bernard Tschumi's field
of colliding programmatic objects in the Parc de la Vilette, and Coop
Himmelblau's unsettling fiery, planar UFA Cinema Center in Dresden. There has
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been such a drift away from traditional Western Architecture by these and other
late 20th-century designers that the student of architecture is left with a very
nebulous idea of what architectural theory is. This then introduces the incredible
need to overhaul and reorganize the divisions within the discourse of
architectural theory.

2.2 The Doubles of Post-Modernism?

In 1980, Robert M. Stern published an influential essay entitled The Doubles of
Post-Modernism, in the first issue of the Harvard Architectural Review. Within
this piece he takes a long, hard look at "post-modernism" --- a term that has been
kicked around in political history and literary and art criticism

now with respect

to a post-Charles Jencks discourse of architecture. Stern begins his analysis of
post-modernism by splitting "modernism" (what he considers to be the "Western
Humanist/Post Renaissance" period) into two different camps: with the help of
Kermode he labels the first mode the schismatic, and with the help of Spender he
labels the second mode 'traditional'. He says that "...The schismatic argues for a
clean break with Western Humanism...", while the traditional "...argues for a
recognition of the continuity of the Western Humanist tradition..." This binarydialectical splitting within discourse is in itself a very 'traditional' move on the part
of Stern, since binary opposition is a crucial part of Western Humanist thought --however, Stern fails to acknowledge this fact within the essay. Luckily, Stern
does not limit himself to this simple set of initial oppositions.

This re-

interpretation of his 1980 essay will attempt to show that Stern's own ideas can
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be taken much further away from the 'traditional' sense of discourse than he was
able to or had desired to at the time of writing.
The approach taken by Stern in this essay is self-proclaimed to be
"...nonargumentative, leading to an interpretation of the historical and cultural
place of Post Modernism rather than polemics for it." [ref SternOl p.75] What
Stern fails to realize is that it is impossible for a cultural critic not to show his or
her polemics when defining the core aspects of Post-Modernism. We all know
from his shingle-style, sub-urban-minded rhetoric is that he himself is a traditional
post-modernist to the core. Thus, to claim to proceed "nonargumentative"-ly in
this essay is absurd.
Stern makes this clear in his overall approach to historical analysis. After
naming the binary 'schismatic'/'traditional' pair, he starts off by talking about the
doubles of modernism (small "m") and then those of Modernism (big "m"),
finishes with the doubles of Post-Modernism. In moving from a brief discussion
of modernism to expound at length about the two modes of Modernism, Stern
proceeds to claim that there cannot be only two modes of Post-Modernism. This
makes sense, since Post-Modernism prides itself on being pluralistic. But, rather
than breaking the Post-Modern period into all of its possible combinations (based
upon the logic of his discussion thus far), he wearily contends that there are
exactly two types of the two modes of 'schismatic' and 'traditional' Postmodernism --- even going so far as to explicitly favor one of each of the two
modes. These are 'traditional' Western discourse traps that Stern is falling into:
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"...(Modern Western) philosophy...does not regard these (binary)
opposites as equivalent. It refuses to allow the possibility that oppositional terms
can coexist peacefully. Invariably one term is privileged through the divestment
of its relative. The resultant economy of privilege sustains an asymmetrical
hierarchy in which one member governs or rules the other throughout the
theological, logical, axiological, and even political domains. It is against just this
(binary) hierarchy that so many post-modern thinkers rebel..." [Taylor 01, p.54]
This odd splitting-upon-splitting technique ultimately leads to great confusion
when attempts are made to comprehend his interpretations of Post-Modernism.
Stern does not give clear reasoning why only this limited branching occurs; but it
can be construed that throughout his analytical process, Stern is merely
proceeding in a 'traditional' Western "binary" fashion in order to deal with the
complexities of Post-Modernism.

2.3 Traditional and Schismatic Postmodernism

Since we were already within the grips of the Post-Modern age (even as of
1980), anyone attempting to analyze the Post-Modern period with respect to the
past will subconsciously do so while looking through a lens of judgement clouded
by the current state of affairs. Robert Stern does not include this notion in his
historical analysis, which leaves it lacking in depth considerably. The initial
premise and early methodologies included in this essay are so strong that it
would be a shame to toss Stern's work aside and begin anew. Therefore, it is
now necessary to reorganize Stern's essay. Instead working through the
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temporal sequence of modern-Modern-Post Modern, we will instead look at all
possible permutations of the interactions between these three relatively wellentrenched period-labels, based on the perception of the Post-Modern.
In this re-interpretation of Stern, "Western" replaces his notion of the
"modern" or "Western Humanist/Post Renaissance" period, to avoid confusion.
Also, in each of the following cases it is presumed that Western Humanist period
came about with a break from the rest of Architectural History:

Here is the case where the Postmodern period follows the Modern, which
follows the Western Humanist age; this is a standard time line approach to
representing history. Each period remains distinct, yet builds upon the previous
period. This is the polemical approach taken by Robert A. M. Stern from at times,
but more so by Aldo Rossi with his style of historical continuity and synchronic
signification, and by Michael Graves later on in his career with his mix of
Classical motifs and inexpensive, modern materials.
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Type II: Traditional Post-Modernism:
Here is the case where the Postmodern period follows a period that is
viewed as the Modern / Western Humanist age; this is a special case where the
Modern and Western periods are seen as unbroken, as was portrayed in much of
+ha %Ain rie of rnlin

PrwAhca eaencir•in11%, irt

/;11.-.

Type Ill: Traditional Post-Modernism:
Here is the case where the Postmodern and Modern periods follow the
Western Humanist age; this is a special case where the Postmodern and
Modern periods are seen as unbroken, as is the polemical approach taken by
neo-Corbusians such as Richard Meier and the early Michael Graves.
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Here is the case where the Postmodern period directly follows the
Western Humanist age; this is a special case that tends to favor its 'traditional'
component over its 'schismatic' component, wherein the Modern period is
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deleted from history at all cost. This is the polemical approach taken by
conservative reactionaries such as T.J. Smith and for the most part, Robert A. M.
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begun by the Modern period of breaking off completely with the previous period,
the Western Humanist period. This is a special case that tends to favor its
'schismatic' component over its 'traditional' component, and is the polemical
approach taken by liberal radicals such as Lebbeus Woods, Daniel Liebeskind,
and Morphosis.

Type VI: Schismatic Post-Modernism:
Here is the case where the Postmodern and Modern periods appear
unbroken, yet break completely with the Western Humanist age; this is a special
case where the Modern and Post-Modern periods, though conflated into an overarching era, are viewed as radically different from the Western Humanist age.
This is the polemical approach taken for the most part by Jean Nouvel, Rem

19

Koolhaas and early Peter Eisenman, where modern motifs get recycled in a
strange manner.

r- iyur c c.

1

Type VII: Schismatic Post-Modernism:
Here is the case where the Postmodern period breaks off from the Modern
/ Western Humanist age; this is a special case where the Postmodern period is
set free from the menacing combination of the Modern / Western Humanist
periods. This is the polemical approach taken by any Postmodern architect who
respects the work of Colin Rowe, including Peter Eisenman, Bernard Tschumi,
and Steven H oll.
The point of the previous reinterpretation of Robert A.M. Stern's 1980
essay is to briefly narrow down the scope of the theoretical and polemical
concern of this thesis. Both the 'traditional' and 'schismatic' modes of
Postmodern architectural theory are evolutionary in nature, but the 'schismatic'
modes have been significantly more "forward-thinking" than that of any of the
'traditional' modes. In accepting the notion of caesura, or "breaking off', from
previous historical periods, the 'schismatic' modes have directed very potent and
agile "attacks" on the body of Modernist / Western Humanist thought whether
it be in the realm of Tschumi's disjunctional programming, Morphosis' adaptation
of particle physics diagrams to world scale topographies, or Eisenman's
semiological applications of computer-aided design. The 'traditional'-minded
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semiological applications of computer-aided design. The 'traditional'-minded
designer believes that the past is a fertile pasture for light-hearted tinkering, while
the 'schismatic' designer acknowledges the fact that we cannot forget the past,
however we must try at all costs to distance ourselves from it in order to produce
innovative work that challenges the theoretical status quo. In addition, it can be
said that the 'traditional' designer views these three main historical periods as an
interplay between the two-dimensional world of design and the three-dimensional
world of production, while the 'schismatic' designer compresses and muddies the
two, three, and four-dimensional aspects of space and time into both design and
production. The "dynamic" nature of this 'schismatic' discourse is considerably
more in-sync with the fast-paced late-capitalist MTV style on-the-brink-of virtual
architecture world we currently live in. For these reasons, this thesis will
concentrate further only on the 'schismatic' mode of postmodern architectural
theory.
Beginning in the 1960's with the work of Archigram, Robert Venturi and
Denise Scott Brown, Peter Eisenman, and the likes, 'schismatic' postmodernist
architectural theory gained a critical sense of mass. These pioneering thinkers
planted the seeds of a period of unprecedented theoretical evolution. In shifting
their focus upon the previously marginal and culturally taboo realms of pop-art,
computer-aided design, signs and signage, Las Vegas, and advertising, these
designers paved the way for a new tradition (as Eisenman would say) of "decentering the metaphysic" of architecture injecting new life into the historically
entrenched realm of architectural theory. The theoretical work these men and
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women introduced into the discourse of architectural theory for the most part
arrived on the scene not in the form of buildings and structures, but rather as
images. Lasting, powerful images... in books, in magazines, on computer
screens... bot overall, disseminated primarily as images.
This shift from relying solely upon the dissemination of ideas surrounding
built work to that of representations of both buildings and conceptual frameworks
signals a key period in the evolution of schismatic architectural theory. These
investigations have led to a dearth of examinations of the interplay of semiology
and architecture, most notably the investigations of Diane Agrest and Mario
Grandelsonas in Semiotics and Architecture: Ideological Consumption or
Theoretical Work (1973) and that of Geoffery Broadbent in A Plain Man's Guide
to the Theory of Signs in Architecture (1977). But in order to fully understand the
mechanisms of the semiology and architecture, we must first understand the
mechanisms of semiology in general, and for that we must turn to renowned
scholar and linguist Roland Barthes.

2.4 Barthes and Semiology

"...semiology... knows only one operation: reading, or deciphering." [Barthes,
Mythologies, p.114]
The prime candidate for a rich, multi-dimensional model of the sign is Roland
Barthes. In his seminal essay entitled "The Imagination of the Sign", Barthes
states right off that "Every sign includes or implies three relationships." [Barthes,
The Imaginetion of the Sign in A Berthes Reader edit. by Sontag, p. 211] He
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goes on to say that there is "...an interior relationship... and two exterior
relationships... a virtual and an actual one." These three relationships are
described as follows:
1. The "symbolic" relationship (interior): basically the traditional, "geological"

[ibid. p.213] relationship between the signifier and signified as first proposed
by Saussure, wherein there lies a symbol (signifier) and a concept (signified)
that are tightly connected in the entity of the sign. Example: the term "bus"
and the iconic image of a yellow school bus we all carry around somewhere in
our psyche. This type of 'consciousness' of the sign relies on resemblance
and on the analogical relationship between the symbol (signifier) and the
concept (signified), which together generate the form of the sign. Barthes
states that this relationship has "dominated the sociology of symbols and of
course a share of psychoanalysis in its early stages..." [ibid. 213] "The
symbolic consciousness implies an imagination of depth; ...the relation of

form and content is ceaselessly renewed by time (history) , the superstructure
overwhelmed by the infrastructure, without our ever being able to grasp the
structure itself." [ibid. 216]
2. The "paradigmatic" relationship (exterior, virtual): a more linguistic

relationship, one which "implies the existence of a 'memory' of forms from
which it is distinguished by the smallest difference necessary and sufficient to
effect a change of meaning." [p.211]

This relationship relies upon the

knowledge of the reader to surround the sign with other terms that are very
similar, but imply slightly different meanings. Example: the terms "busses",
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"school bus" and "Peter Pan bus" all describe "bus", but each one is slightly
different. "The paradigmatic consciousness therefore defines meaning not
as the simple encounter of signifier and signified, but, according to MerleauPonty's splendid expression, as a veritable 'modulation of co-existence'; it
substitutes for the bilateral relation of the symbolic consciousness a
quadrilateral or more precisely a homological relation." [ibid. 214] The
paradigmatic consciousness... is a formal imagination; it sees the signifier as
linked, as if in profile, to several virtual signifiers which it is at once close to
and distinct from: it no longer sees the sign in depth, it sees it in its
perspective..." [ibid. 216]
3. The "syntagmatic" relationship (exterior, actual): "the sign is no longer
situated with regard to its (virtual) 'brothers', but with regards to its (actual)
`neighbors'. [p.212 (parenth. Barthes)] In other words, this relationship
implies the shifts in meaning that occur due to the words that the sign is
actually in play with in a given phrase. An example would be the way "bus" is
deformed in meaning by the other terms in the phrase: "the double-decker
bus with no driver on the top". This consciousness of the sign is "essentially a
consciousness of the constraints, tolerances, and liberties of the sign's
associations." [ibid. 215] "The syntagmatic imagination no longer sees the
sign in its perspective, it foresees it in its extension: its antecedent or
consequent links, the bridges it extends to other signs; this is a `stemmatous'
imagination of the chain or network..." [ibid. 217]
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Barthes makes it very clear that these are not three independent types of signs,
but rather "correspond to a certain moment of reflection" upon any sign. All three
of these relationships are at work any given time that we interpret a sign, and all
three can be perceived about any sign, just not at the same time. These
descriptions of the "Imagination of the Sign" provide a more detailed road map of
the mechanisms of differance. Not only is there a differment and difference at
work within the symbolic signifier/signified aspect of the sign, but there is also
play involving the linkage between the meanings of "virtual, homological" terms of
the paradigmatic consciousness and the network of "actual, stemmatous" terms
of the syntagmatic consciousness. This is obviously dependent upon the point of
view you take during the analysis of a reading of signs.
"What is characteristic of myth? To transform a meaning into form. In
other words, myth is always language-robbery." [Roland Barthes in Mythologies,
p. 131]
Another way that Roland Barthes has elaborated on a rich, multivalent
model of semiological signification is in his ruminations on 'myth' in Mythologies.
He sets out from the onset to clarify that myth is not what we refer to when we
think of Aphrodite and Zeus, Mercury and Thor. No, he says, "myth is a type of
speech... (and) since myth is a type of speech, everything can be a myth
provided it is conveyed by a discourse. Myth is not defined by the object of its
message, but by the way in which it utters this message: there are formal limits to
myth, there are no 'substantial' ones. Everything, then, can be a myth? Yes, I
believe this, for the universe is infinitely fertile in suggestions..." [Barthes,
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Mythologies, p.109] Barthes also goes on to explain that there is a discrete
semiology of myth, one that is equally as complex as that posed by Derrida
through difference.
Barthes begins this semiology of myth by describing the birth of
semiological discourse: "... since Saussure himself, and sometimes
independently of him, a whole section of contemporary research has constantly
been referred to the problem of meaning... no longer concerned with facts except
as much as they are endowed with significance. Now to postulate a signification
is to have resource to semiology... I do not mean that semiology could account
for all these aspects of research... but... they are all sciences dealing with
values. They are not content with meeting the facts: they define and explore
them as tokens for something else" [Barthes, Mythologies, p.111]
Barthes begins an elaborate and compelling deconstruction of myth by
stating: "Mythical speech is made of material which has already been worked on
so as to make it suitable for communication: it is because all the materials of
myth (whether pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that
one can reason about them while discounting their substance. This substance is
unimportant..." [Barthes, Mythologies, p.110] Pirsig relies upon loose reference
to quite a number of famous and revered thinkers to render credibility to his
search for meaning through a pluralistic study of values and morals, relying on
what Barthes just described as 'material which has already been worked on...'.
Following these associations with poetic accounts of his motorcycle trip across
America with his ten year old son, his text becomes suddenly more credible
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when viewed as myth and not as philosophic or scientific fact. A good example
of this would be where in the 'afterword' of Zen, Pirsig ruminates on the Ancient
Greek view of time — one where they "saw the future as something that came
upon them from behind their backs with the past receding before their eyes."
[Pirsig, Zen..., p. 375] Pirsig latches onto this well-worn concept of temporal
movement through a series of questions, integrating the philosophical and
mythical qualities of the argument into his own mythical account of his sons
death soon after the completion of the novel.
The mechanisms involved in this "mythologizing" are simple and yet
complex. Barthes outlines them clearly in Mythologies, but in a more scattered
rather than succinct format. He says, "In myth, we find again the tridimensional
pattern... (of) the signifier, the signified and the sign. But myth is a particular
system, in that it is constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it:
it is a second order semiological system. That which was a sign (namely the
associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere
signifier in the second." . As a clarification of this he writes:

r, Signifier I a. Signified
Language
MYTH"

3, Sign
I SIGNIFIER

H SIGNIFIED

HI SIGN

Figure 2.8

"It can be seen in myth there are two semiological systems, one of which
is staggered in relation to the other: a linguistic system, the language (or the
modes of representation which are assimilated to it ), which I shall call the
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languege-object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to

build its own system; and the myth itself, which I shall call metelanguage,
because it is a second language, in which one speaks about the first. [Barthes,
Mythologies, p.115]

Barthes cites this image of a Negro soldier saluting the French flag as
myth:
"I am at the barber's, and a copy of Paris-Match is offered to me. On the
cover, a young Negro in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted,
probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this is the meaning of the picture.
But, whether naively or not, I see very well what it signifies to me: that France is
a great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully
serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an
aged colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called
oppressors. I am therefore again faced with a greater semiological system: there
is a signifier, itself already formed with a previous system ( a bleck soldier is
giving the French salute ); there is a signified ( it is here a purposeful mixture of

Frenchness and militariness ); finally, there is the presence of the signified
through the signifier."
Barthes clarifies the mechanism that underlie these first- and secondorder systems by defining a three key terms: "meaning" -- which is the sign on
the plane of the linguistic first-order system (3. above), "form" — which is the
signifier on the plane of the second-order system of myth (I. above), and
"concept" — which stands as the second-order mythic sign (Ill. above). These
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definitions are crucial to understand in order to grasp his ultimate statements on
mythic signification: "The signifier of myth presents itself in an ambiguous way:
it is at the same time meaning and form, full on one side and empty on the other.
...in the meaning, a signification is already built, and could very well be selfsufficient if myth did not take hold of it and did not turn it suddenly into an empty,
parasitical form. The meaning (the first-order sign) is already complete, it
postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of facts,
ideas, decisions. When it becomes form (the second-order signifier), the
meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it becomes
impoverished, history evaporates, only the letter remains. There is here a
paradoxical permutation in the reading operations, an abnormal regression from
meaning to form, from the linguistic sign to the mythical signifier." [Barthes,
Mythologies, p.117]

The author reiterates this point by describing just what happens during
that switch from first-order linguistic sign to the second-order mythic signifier:
"...the essential point of all this is that the form does not suppress the meaning, it
only impoverishes it, it puts it at a distance, it holds it a one's disposal. ...the form
must constantly be able to be rooted again in the meaning and to get there what
it nature it needs for its nutriment; above all it must be able to hide there. It is this
constant game of hide-and-seek between the meaning and the form which
defines myth. The form of myth is not a symbol: the Negro who salutes is not a
symbol of the French Empire: he has too much presence, he appears as a rich,
fully experienced, spontaneous, innocent, indisputable image. But at the same
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time this presence is tamed, put at a distance, made almost transparent; it
recedes a little, it becomes the accomplice of a concept which comes to it fully
armed, French imperiality: once made use of, becomes artificial." [Barthes,
Mythologies, p.118]

Continuing from the "meaning" (the first-order sign) to the "form" (the
second-order signifier), onward to the to the "concept" (the second-order sign),
Barthes states: "Unlike the form, the concept is in no way abstract: it is filled with
a situation. Through the concept, it is a whole new history which is implanted in
the myth. ...In this sense, we can say that the fundamental character of the
mythical concept is to be appropriated..." [Barthes, Mythologies, p.119]
Yet in analyzing a myth, Barthes acknowledges that there is no clear way
to "demystify" this appropriation: "...we constantly drift between the object (text,
image...) and its demystification, powerless to render its wholeness. For if we
penetrate the object, we liberate it but we destroy it; and if we acknowledge its
full weight, we respect it, but we restore it to a state which is still mystified. It
would seem that we are condemned for some time yet to speak excessively
about reality."
Barthes shows us that myth functions on a more lateral basis than
différence, where signifiers become signs through an exterior mechanism of

scale rather than of interior signification. What the author is explaining is that this
discussion of myth as a second-order metalanguage shows yet another road
map to the deferral and difference that can function in a semiological reading of a
text.

CHAPTER THREE
Pirsig and Derrida: a Pre-"différance" Presence
"...In many ways, deconstruction might seem an unlikely partner for religious
reflection. As a form of thought it appears avowedly atheistic. Derrida speaks for
others as well as himself when he adamantly maintains that deconstruction
"blocks every relationship to theology." [ref. Derrida03] Paradoxically, it is just
this antithetical association with theology that lends deconstruction its "religious"
significance for marginal thinkers. By reflecting and recasting the pathos of so
much contemporary art, literature, and philosophy, deconstruction expresses
greater appreciation for the significance of the death of God then most
contemporary philosophers of religion and theologians... One of the distinctive
features of deconstruction is its willingness to confront the problem of the death
of God squarely even if not always directly. The insights released by
deconstructive criticism suggest the ramifications of the death of God for areas
as apparently distinct as contemporary psychology, linguistics, and historical
analysis." [ref. Taylor01]

30

31

3A Différance

Since the late 1970's and early 1980's, a good portion of the discourse of
'schismatic' post-modern architectural theory has been willfully trapped within the
grip of the profound French cultural critic Jacques Derrida. From Peter Eisenman
to Bernard Tschumi to John Hejduk to Daniel Libenskind to Coop Himelblau,
'schismatic' post-modern architectural theory has fully embraced the radical ideas
put forth by Derridian difference and Deconstruction. Tschumi had Derrida design
a park-object at La Villette, and Eisenman has included Derrida in his writing and
lecturing. At the same time, with this overwhelming urge to thoroughly work out
Derrida's inherently dynamic ideas within the theoretical discourse of
architecture, almost all of the 'schismatic' post-modern architectural theory that
has been disseminated and put into practice has eventually stagnated into the
free-play of architectural form. It is as if the blatant application of 'schismatic'
theory to architectural practice leaves an inherent gap between the experience
and intellectualization of these postmodern structures. This is ultimately due to
the fact that formal exercises are all that can ultimately be achieved within a
theoretical framework that relies upon these two Derridian tenets:
1. There can be no true knowledge or understanding because a radical
deconstruction based on difference begins and ends in the free-play of all
signification, and...
2. Therefore there can be no consciously applied discourse, because after
application, conveyance of meaning is trapped within the same endless free-play
of difference that undermines the production of discourse itself. As a result no
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architectural theory can stand up to close scrutiny and criticism, and no
architectural theory can be conveyed through architectural production. Thus,
architectural theory ends by folding into itself within this free-play of signification.
As one can see, these tenets leave an incredible sense of despair to the
architectural theorist basing his or her work on the most radical notions of
Derridian 'deconstruction'. In not accepting the impending facile death of applied
'schismatic' post-modern architectural theory based on deconstruction and
difference, this thesis attempts (with a great debt paid to authors Robert M.
Pirsig, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes) to unhinge the unwielding grip that
difference has had on the general production of discourse and the specific
production of applied schismatic postmodern architectural theory.
Derrida has ambivalently lead a handful of the strongest, riskiest, and
most eloquent architectural theorists of the late 20th Century down a thickly
brambled path. In an attempt to continue Nietzsche's "nihilistic and subjectivist
devaluation and annulment of what traditionally has been taken to be the truth
about reality..." Derrida has shown theorists in all veins that "...since access to
any objective, privileged meaning is illusory, philosophical or scientific truth is
unmasked as a kind of error." [ref. Mugerauer01 p.66] Derrida cites difference to
be the temporal / spatial fulcrum for the ultimate deconstruction of all experience.
Since it denotes the "delays" involved in all sense-oriented experiences, in the
simple fact that the Latin roots of the term différence signify "to differ" and "to
defer", differance as a verb puts all experience into play. This compelling
argument was put forth by Derrida in his famous essay(s) on the topic; an
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argument that talks of the interpretive and translational powers at play in every
moment of our cognizance, conveniently rendering all experience into a text that
is then open to all of his other textual / analytical devices.
What Derrida has taught us is that due to the inherent 'slipperiness' of
semiological meaning, what we assume to be the foundations of Western thought
can not and will not ever be completely foundational. Robert Mugerauer has
summarized Derrida's concerns brilliantly and succinctly in Derrida and Beyond:
"Perhaps more than any other contemporary thinker, Jacques Derrida
points a way to architectural deconstruction as a situational strategy. According
to Derrida, Western culture is built on the assumption that there are intelligible
first grounds or causes... Derrida contends that (these) are nothing more than
strategies that enable us to assume and act as if the world were intelligible. By
means of metaphysics, the West has concealed from us its own unintelligibility,
its own fictive character....
...What metaphysics conceals is that it rests on a supposition: the desired
objective center is achieved only insofar as a more primal situation is concealed.
A more fundamental, but complex, difference (différence) is suppressed and
concealed by the dominating metaphysics. Derrida holds that difference itself --the binary tensed difference (essentially Heidegerrian) or pairing of presence /
absence, Beings / beings, identity / difference --- is what makes possible the
seeming priority of one and only one member of each pair... This difference is
primal but is no ground in itself; it necessarily has no origin or end but is just
continuing difference...
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Differance, as Derrida uses it, has two senses. It means differ and defer.
To differ means to be spatially separate (nothing, not even the present or
consciousness, is self-present or identical; there is no original identity). To defer
means to temporally separate (nothing ever is wholly present; even the present is
always delayed). Since what we take to be objective reality is fundamentally
spatial and temporal... Derrida is claiming that there is no moment when anything
is given as itself, in full self-present identity; there is always a gap, an absence in
the heart of reality. Indeed, it is this difference which is primal. Metaphysics
erases the primal difference in order to suppress absence, beings, death, and so
on; that is, in order to provide us with a false comfort, both in the most rigorous
activities of high culture and in the everydayness within which we are
submerged."[ref. Mugerauer01 p.67]
Derrida himself says, "An interval must separate the present from what it
is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as
present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also
dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the
present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly
substance or the subject." [ref. Derrida04 p.13]
If difference, and ultimately difference, is the foothold of reality, then there
can be no true comprehension of reality. Period. Without comprehension of
reality, there is no communication of realty, and ultimately no solid form of
discourse, ever. Différance brings about the pervasive sense of despair
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described earlier by affecting the absolute dynamism of all discourse.
Mugerauer, Eisenman, Tschumi and others go on from here and embrace the
radical and analytical 'deconstruction' of discourse as the never-finished task of
the theorist willing to invest in difference. These thinkers create elaborate theses
and theories based on the fundamental right to be able to solicit or 'shake-down'
any metaphysical, political, intellectual, or quotidian edifice. Yet, the same
difference employed as a foundational aspect of the discourse of these theorists
stands as the ultimate trap of any schismatic postmodern architectural theory that
itself is based on the mechanisms of différence. How can one expect to
disseminate information that itself is corrupted by difference, and have it be any
more pertinent or compelling than that which they are 'deconstructing'? This
situation only produces, and has produced, a discrete number of totemic
theorists egotistically vying for supremacy within a self-proclaimed rhetorical
arena.

3.2 A Way Out of the Labyrinth of differance
Yet, there must be a way out of this trap of endless signification without
condemning all theory that recognizes and respects the potential of differance.
There must be more to differance and the limits of semiology than just endless
signification. A way out of the labyrinth of difference would lead to a schismatic
mode of architectural theory that did not wholly contradict itself by disseminating
information that is no better nor worse than its critical source. Seeking a way out
of this labyrinth of contradiction is the main focus of this thesis.
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At this point it is pertinent to cite Bataille's guttural claim that an exit does not
exist from the labyrinth of language and knowledge:
"Bataille reverses the traditional metaphorical sense of the labyrinth that
generally links it with the desire to get out. Just as philosophy allows one to
leave Plato's cave, the labyrinth (from Bacon to Leibnitz) is where those without
access to the thread of knowledge are condemned to lose their way. Knowledge
always takes the form of something to end all error and errantry. Bataille, on the
contrary, denounces ("Icarian") solutions. Above all, he denounces the wish that
it lead somewhere, have a solution (whether a scientific one, praising the merits
of the "ancient geometric conception of the future", or an artistic-utopian one,
dreaming of escape), because the only result of this wish is that, far from being a
real exit from the labyrinth, it transforms the labyrinth into a prison. To will the
future (and not to desire it) to submit to planning and projects, to wish to
construct it, is to lock oneself into a devalorized present that is airless and
unlivable. "The project," according to Bataille, "is the prison." (4) To want to get
out of the labyrinth, making this into a project, is to close it, or to close oneself
inside it. [ref. Hollier01 p.61] (more Bataille)
Yet to not attempt to escape from the labyrinth is to accept Hollier's
reading of Bataille as a type of 'transcendental signified', removing it from the
possibility of 'deconstruction'. One strong possibility of a way out of the
differential maze is to question what happens during the spatial / temporal
"delay" that Derrida cites as the primary / primal mechanism of differance. Since
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Derrida places differance before conception, cognition, and interpretation of the
'sign' --- but after the experience of the 'sign' --- there is a somewhat defined
space and time left unexamined. Derrida himself notes this possibility of
deconstructing différence prior to the consumption of the 'sign', in the essay of
the same name --- "Différance" :
"...But can one not conceive of a presence, and of a presence to itself of
the subject before speech or signs, a presence to itself of the subject in a silent
and intuitive consciousness?"
In other words, Derrida asks the question Can a presence be
conceived that exists between the 'experience' of an event and the subsequent
'interpretation' of that event?
"...Such a question therefore supposes that, prior to the sign and outside
it, excluding any trace and any différence, something like consciousness is
possible. And that consciousness, before distributing its signs in space and in
the world, can gather itself into its presence. But what is consciousness? What
does 'consciousness' mean? Most often, in the very form of meaning, in all its
modifications, consciousness offers itself to thought only as self-presence, as the
perception of self in presence. And what holds for consciousness here holds
here for so-called subjective experience in general. Just as the category of the
subject cannot be, and never has been, thought without the reference to
presence as hupokeimenon or as ousie, etc., so the subject as consciousness
has never manifested itself except as self-presence. The privilege granted to
consciousness therefore signifies the privilege granted to the present; and even if
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one describes the transcendental temporality of consciousness, at the depth at
which Husserl does so, one grants to the 'living present' the power of
synthesizing traces, and of incessantly reassembling them.
This privilege is the ether of metaphysics, the element of our thought that
is caught in the language of metaphysics. One can delimit such a closure today
only by soliciting the value that Heidegger has shown to be the ontotheological
determination of Being; and in thus soliciting the value of presence, by means of
an interrogation whose status must be completely exceptional, we are also
examining the absolute privilege of this form or epoch of presence in general that
is consciousness as meaning in self-presence."
Thus one comes to posit presence --- and specifically consciousness, the
being beside itself of consciousness --- no longer as the absolutely central form
of Being but as a "determination" and as an "effect". A determination or and
effect within a system which is no longer that of presence but of différence, a
system that no longer tolerates the opposition of activity and passivity, nor that of
cause and effect, or of indetermination and determination, etc., such that in
designating consciousness as an effect or a determination, one continues... to
operate according to the lexicon of that which one is de-limiting."
Admittedly, the above is a nearly impenetrable passage of Derrida.
However, since an understanding of this passage is absolutely critical to continue
with this project, a "close reading" will be necessary.
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What Derrida is trying to say here is that, if we are working to intellectually
conceive of a presence that exists prior to the spatialization of signs (or prior to
the mechanisms of difference), then we are essentially trying to conceive of a
presence that exists during the spatial / temporal delay between experience and
interpretation of an event. In order to conceive of a presence that exists prior to
the spatialization of signs, there must be a consciousness that exists prior to the
spatialization of signs, to do the work of conception --- where consciousness is
self-presence. Since presence implies a connection with the present, then that
presence contains the inherent delay of différence. In the same light, both
presence and the present have been deemed privileged Western metaphysical
phenomena by Derrida due to the primal nature of différance --- rendering both
presence and the present fictional. Lastly, he says that presence is essentially
an effect and a determination, and a metaphysic based on differance does not
allow for either effect or determination.
Essentially, Derrida says here that there cannot be any consciousness
without presence, and there cannot be any presence because presence is
conceptually undermined by différence. This can be reduced to the fact that
there cannot be any consciousness before difference therefore one cannot
conceive of anything prior to the mechanisms of différence. In a nut-shell, this
means that Derrida feels that there is nothing that can be conceived of during the
spatial / temporal delay between experience and interpretation of an event.
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3.3 Quality and Différance

Let us recall Derrida's initial question of whether a presence can be conceived
that exists between the experience and the interpretation of an event: "...But can
one not conceive of a presence, and of a presence to itself of the subject before
speech or signs, a presence to itself of the subject in a silent and intuitive
consciousness?" In answering this question in order to avoid criticism on this
pre-différance front, Derrida has missed a few key aspects that can fall under

criticism. These key terms are "conceive" and "subject", and these terms mark
the fissure, the crack in the armour of différance that this thesis will take its
critical aim upon. This marks the beginning of a lengthy deconstruction... which
could quite possibly lead to the ultimate deconstruction --- the deconstruction of
différance, the 'original' seed of all previous deconstruction.

The main fulcrum that will be employed for this deconstruction is the work
of Robert M. Pirsig. There are many reasons to employ Pirsig for this task, and
equally, if not more reasons to shy away from employing his work in an academic
inquiry. One of the main reasons I first became enamored with the work of
Robert Pirsig is his absolute abhorrence of the subject-object nature of Western
Metaphysics. That is why an analytical deconstruction of Pirsig's work must be
undertaken before the intersection between Pirsig and Derrida may take place.
The most challenging aspect of this deconstruction of différance is the
method of analysis. A deconstruction of Robert Pirsig's two books, Zen and the
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values and Lila: An Inquiry into
Morals, is required prior to a full deconstruction of différance, in order to clarify
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the most potent and powerful aspects of his work and to exclude the portions that
undermine itself. Only when that is accomplished can the deconstruction of
différance proceed, paradoxically, upon terra firma.
A deconstruction of Pirsig's work must begin with "Quality", the central
investigation of the body of his work.
Soon after beginning to teach Creative Writing at Minnesota State
University, a colleague told Robert Pirsig "I hope you are teaching Quality to your
students." [ref. Pirsig01 p.160] A few months later this colleague trotted by his
office again and said "Are you really teaching Quality this quarter?" --- to which
he replied "Definitely."[ref. Pirsig01 p.161] Later on that day Pirsig realized that
he himself did not truly understand what "Quality" was, and yet was using the
term to describe his teaching style. After a deliberating about this for hours on
end, he left his office at 3 a.m. and "confessed to himself that he didn't have a
clue as to what "Quality" was..."
"Most people would have forgotten about 'Quality' at this point, or just left it
hanging suspended... But he was so despondent about his own ability to teach
what he believed, he really didn't give a damn about whatever else he was
supposed to do, and then he woke up the next morning and there was 'Quality'
staring him in the face...
Quality -- you know what it is, yet you don't know what it is But that's selfcontradictory. But some things are better than others, that is, they have more
Quality. But when you try to say what the Quality is, apart from the things that
have it, it all goes goof! There's nothing to talk about. But if you can't say what
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Quality is, how do you know what it is, or how do you know that it even exists? If
no one knows what it is, then for all practical purposes it doesn't exist at all. But
for all practical purposes it does exist... What is Quality?" [ref. Pirsig01 p.163]
From this day forth Robert Pirsig began an obsessive quest to truly
understand "Quality". He made it the focus of both Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values and Lila: An Inquiry into Morals, and through

these inquiries has achieved an unprecedented understanding of the concept of
"Quality". Pirsig has continually refused to define the term "Quality" itself, even
though both of his novels deal with the act of defining the inner mechanisms of
"Quality":
"And yet here was Quality; a tiny, almost unnoticeable fault line; a line of
illogic in our concept of the universe; and you tapped it, and the whole universe
came apart, so neatly it was unbelievable. He wished Kant were alive. Kant
would have appreciated it. That master diamond cutter. He would see. Hold
Quality undefined. That was the secret." [ref. Pirsig01 p.196]
Pirsig does not entirely leave "Quality" undefined, however. In sub-titling
his book, An Inquiry Into Values, he is directly linking "Quality" to 'value'. This is
a key linkage. He confirms this in saying in Lila..., "...Before he had gone up into
the mountains, he had written a whole book on values. Quality. Quality was
value. They were the same thing." [ref. Pirsig02 p.58]
In his first book, Zen..., Robert Pirsig attempts to examine "Quality" with
respect to the history of Western Philosophy. In the process, he directly
challenges the subject / object dichotomy that is the cornerstone of Western
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Philosophy, by questioning whether "Quality" exists merely in the mind (of the
subject), or exists in the thing itself (in the object).
Pirsig's response to the critical question is as follows: If "Quality" exists
only in the mind, "then, ...Quality... is just another name for whatever you like..."
[ref. Pirsig01 p.229] and if "Quality" exists in the object, "then you must explain

and a subject, "You" (the reader). As you begin to comprehend this image, you
have already experienced "Quality". To explain exactly what "Quality" is requires
a trip back in time, back to this point of recognition.
Pirsig states: "...although you normally associate Quality with objects,
feelings of Quality sometimes occur without any object at all. This is what lead
him at first to think that maybe Quality is all subjective. But subjective pleasure
wasn't what he meant by Quality either. Quality decreases subjectivity. Quality
takes you out of yourself, makes you aware of the world around you. Quality is
opposed to subjectivity." [ref. Pirsig01 p. 214]
From here Pirsig moves on to begin to more concretely define "Quality":
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"...Quality couldn't be independently related with either the subject or the object
but could be found only in the relationship of the two with each other. It is the
point at which the subject and object meet... Quality is not a thing. It is an
event... at which the subject becomes aware of the object. And because without
objects there can be no subject because the objects create the subject's
awareness of himself --- Quality is the event at which awareness of both subjects
and objects is made possible... This means Quality is not the result of a collision
between subject and object. The very existence of subject and object
themselves is deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of
subjects and objects, which are mistakenly presumed to be the cause of Quality!"
[ref. PirsigOl p.228]
This intervention of "Quality" before the 'subject' and the 'object' is a
radical departure from traditional Western Humanist philosophy. From the
Greeks to Decartes to Heidegger, the sacred cow of the subject / object as
primary-dialectical / metaphysical-split has remained central to this philosophy.
Yet, having made this move, the concept of "Quality" remains vague and
'mystical' at this point, so we must delve further into Pirsig's "definition of
"Quality".
In Pirsig further elaborates on "Quality" as he sees it working within
the patterns of human evolution. Citing the discourse of anthropology
(specifically its developments into 'evolution', 'natural selection', and 'survival-ofthe-fittest') as the impetus for this move, Pirsig goes on to summarize the
"Quality" levels of human evolution as four main strata: the inorganic level, the
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organic level, the social level, and the intellectual level. What he is saying is that
as humans evolved from mere electrons, protons, neutrons and molecules
(inorganic) to carbon-based self-replicating creatures with complex, interdependent organ structures (organic), they organized themselves into nomadic
and settled communities (social), where they finally collected and shared through
language thoughts and ideas concerning the nature of existence (intellectual).
Thus the four main strata are the inorganic, organic, social, and intellectual
levels. Pirsig cites Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" as the historical
declaration of independence of the intellectual level of evolution from the social
level of evolution, and the ability of 'life' to overcome 'death' as the historical
declaration of independence of the organic level of evolution from the inorganic
level of evolution. The difference between the exterior interactions of an
individual in a society and the internal working of that individual constitute the
independence of the organic and social levels of Quality During this summary,
Pirsig also describes the two main modes of "Quality" at play between and during
these evolutionary levels as 'static' and 'dynamic' Quality.
All of these terms require further definition. It has been found that it is
initially more effective to discuss these evolutionary patterns synchronically,
rather than diachronically, since they comprise the mechanisms of the 'system' of
the "Quality" event. (Later on it will be necessary to examine these terms
diachronically as well.) Pirsig presents these six terms as a hierarchical ladder,
much like this:

46

Pirsig sees things, each subsequent level is built upon the "static" foundation of
the previous level or levels. It would not be possible to have living (organic)
beings without a relatively stable set of molecular (inorganic) building blocks; just
as is would not be possible to have interactive (social) beings without there first
living (organic) beings, nor thinking (intellectual) beings without the interactive
(social) exchange of language and information. Each level is dependent upon
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the previous levels, and at the same time has its own internal mechanisms that
act independently of those levels. After all, there are parts of the 'brain' that
simply control motor skills and subconscious habitual actions --- organic central
nervous locations --- that are different than those parts of the brain that compose
the 'mind' --- the pondering, sentient, intellectual center of the being --- yet, both
take place within the organic structure of the brain itself.
What is fascinating about Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality is the fact that it
is a working system — one where there are static and dynamic aspects to each of
the four levels of Quality described above. These two modes of "static" and
"dynamic" Quality also could be easily misconstrued as yet another simple binary
dialectical opposition to replace the long list of Western Humanist polar opposites
utilized in theoretical pursuits, but this is certainly not the case with the work of
Robert Pirsig. Rather than merely positing another binary opposition within
which culture can favor one term and suppress the other, Pirsig has
acknowledged the interdependence of "static" and "dynamic" Quality from the
very beginning:
"Sometimes a dynamic increment goes forward but can find no latching
mechanism and so it fails and slips back into a previously latched (static)
position. Whole species and cultures get lost this way. Sometimes a static
pattern becomes so powerful it prohibits any dynamic moves forward. In both
cases the evolutionary process is halted for a while. But when it's not halted the
result has been an increase in power to control hostile forces or an increase in
versatility, or both. The increase in versatility is directed toward dynamic Quality.
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The increase in power to control hostile forces is directed toward static Quality.
Without dynamic Quality the organism cannot grow. Without static Quality the
organism cannot last. Both are needed." [ref. Pirsig02 p.147]
Obviously, Pirsig is using the word "organism" loosely here, basically to
stand in for any complex "static" level of Quality. But other than that, this is not a
'loose' statement at all. To provide a first-split of a metaphysics as an
interdependent pair of terms, and acknowledging their interdependence to this
degree is again, unprecedented. It is as if Pirsig is creating a metaphysical
system that includes an analytical deconstruction of itself within its very first
moves, and yet does not come crashing down with the realization of that
important fact. Essentially here we have hit upon Picasso's famous quote: "You
must learn the rules in order to break them." Learning the rules is "static"
Quality. Breaking the rules is "dynamic" Quality.
Pirsig also goes on to say: "Static Quality patterns are dead when they are
exclusive, when they demand blind obedience and suppress dynamic change.
But static patterns, nevertheless, provide a necessary stabilizing force to protect
dynamic progress from degeneration. Although dynamic Quality, the quality of
freedom, creates the world in which we live, these patterns of static Quality, the
quality of order, preserve our world. Neither static nor dynamic Quality can
survive without the other." [ref. Pirsig02 p.121]
Let's get back to Pirsig's initial hierarchical ladder of Quality, and what this
information means for our earlier example of subject (the reader) / object ("A")
interaction. Looking at this from Pirsig's point of view and using the fulcrum of
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Quality, this becomes a completely different event than the decision of whether
Quality exists within the subject or object. You will see now that question has
been rendered moot.

OBJECT
Figure 3.3

The object now defined as a three-dimensional pyramid made up of
"inorganic" Quality, while the subject (you) is defined as a complex
interdependent system of "inorganic", "organic", "social", and "intellectual" levels
of Quality. Quality is not only at work within the object and the subject, but also
an inseparable component of the interaction between subject and object. In
seeing object "A", you (the subject) are being bombarded by (inorganic) light
waves emanating from a source and landing on the retina in your (organic) eyes
which are made up of carbon-based (inorganic) molecules and various atoms.
The information from your eyes is then transferred to your brain by a complex
(inorganic: electrical / organic: carbon-based conduit) neurological network. This
information gets translated into an image through an extremely complex process
of (socially) shared and (intellectually) intuited language, into an image of object
"A" (which marks the beginning point of the semiology of this exchange). Each of
these evolutionary levels that take part in this exchange of information have
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sought out their own static level of Quality over thousands of years, based on the
nature of each piece. Instead of this event merely encompassing an
'intellectualized' metaphysical experience, the event of the subject (you) seeing
the object ("A") utilizes numerous levels of Quality, from inorganic to intellectual

-

- at times moving dynamically within the system, at other times coming to rest
into some static "form".
Lets say that object "A" is a copper pyramid that has a green patina on it -- only you (the subject) are red-green colorblind (though rare, this condition can
occur in both men and women). Because you are colorblind, you are unable to
see the green patina, and as result the whole pyramid appears copper. Does
this mean the green patina is not there? Of course not. Something about
yourself, your (organic) genetic makeup has denied you (the subject) the ability
to see the colors green and red. But this fact does not change the (inorganic)
molecular makeup of the pyramid (the object) itself, and the temporal weathering
which produced the patina. You are just unable to see it. In the same light, all
humans are unable to see most of the etectro-magnetic spectrum, of which
visible light comprises only one percent. Our perception of the world would be
quite chaotic if we could "see" all of microwaves, radio waves, television
broadcasts in transit, infrared waves, and gamma waves around us every day.
Just because we are unable to "see" these does not mean that they do not exist.
In other words, under the metaphysics of Quality, objects and subjects are
made up of complex levels of inorganic, organic, social, and intellectual Quality,
and essentially lose their distinction as subjects and objects. All of the
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complexities of subject / object Western Humanist metaphysics dissolve under
the Metaphysics of Quality. There is no longer a question as to whether objects
exist only in the mind of subjects, or if objects create subjects, or even if subjects
and objects exist independently.
Though this is a simple model of an observation under the Metaphysics of
Quality, it illustrates beautifully how the act of observation itself is far more
complex than metaphysics has ever contended it to be. These complexities
unearthed by the Metaphysics of Quality will be employed further on in this thesis
to explore and reconsider Derrida's definition of différance.
At this point it is now possible, after pointing out the various types of
Quality, to further define Quality in general. In Lila..., Robert Pirsig attempts to
go beyond his definition of Quality in Zen..., which was as an analytical,
descriptive sense of value. In Lila... he claims that Quality is more than a sense
of value, and points the whole novel towards the idea that Quality is a
proscriptive and prescriptive sense of morality. Unfortunately this signals the end
of Pirsig's valid attempt at redefining Western Humanist metaphysics with the
Metaphysics of Quality. By forcing Quality from a realm of analysis into one of
judgment, Pirsig effectively neutralizes his own thesis --- a thesis which was at
first 'academic', now becomes 'ideological' in nature. 1

' Since elaboration on this realm of Quality as morality interferes with the continuity of the argument for the intersection of
Quality and differance, the explanation of this ideological problem has been shifted to Appendix B.

CHAPTER FOUR
Pirsig, "Quality", and "Indifférance"
"...at the cutting edge of time, before an object can be distinguished, there must
be a kind of nonintellectual awareness, which he called awareness of Quality.
You can't be aware that you've seen a tree until after you've seen the tree, and
between the instant of vision and the instant of awareness there must be a time
lag." [ref. Pirsig01 p.221]

52

53

4.1 Quality and Indifférance
If Quality remains a temporal and spatial nexus of static and dynamic patterning
and is not forced into an ideology of morality (See Appendix A), it can be shown
that Quality as an analytical notion of value is an indispensable tool for
understanding the full mechanisms of différance. This is now the task at hand.
It has been shown that there is a circular, nonsensical, endless play of
signification that Deconstruction and différance impose when working
simultaneously; and thus all experience is forced to become an interpreted text.
This effectively neutralizes experience into an non-communicable, solitary nonentity. Plato has taught us, in so many words, that "The Unexamined Life is not
Worth Living"; but Derrida has taught us that, "The Examined Life is Never
Experienced, Only Interpreted."
Let's say one is having an experience --- like walking a dog, or washing a
car --- and lets call this experience, the experience. Now, the experience is
made up information, which is in turn made up of a series of experienced signs:
in the case of walking a dog, these signs are aspects of the weather, the type of
dog, the interaction between oneself and the dog... or in the case of washing a
car, the type of car, and the location of the event... etc. come into play. In
attempting to comprehend the experience in terms of the signs involved, one is
forced to rectify the temporal and spatial delays imposed by the concept of
différance --- delays which force one to interpret the experience. Once

interpretation is conjoined with the experience, the experience essentially
becomes a type of text which is being interpreted. In this act of interpretation, the
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experience is rendered impotent, since all interpretations of a text require a deep
analysis of the play of the signification of each sign involved in the text.
According to Derridian deconstruction, each of these signs do not signify an
object or a meaning associated with that sign (as Saussure would have us
believe) but rather begin a complex march of signifying other signs, which in turn
signify other signs, which in turn signify other signs.
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But, as one may note, there is a space of time and a time of space
involved in the delay between experience and interpretation. What actually
occurs in this space and time that lies between experience and interpretation?
What actually occurs in this space and time that lies between 'experience'
and 'interpretation' is a fascinating chain of events — one which I call

"indifférance". It is obvious that if one wishes to comprehend the experience, one
must stop experiencing, and begin interpreting the experience -- that is what
Derrida speaks volumes of with différance. Since we as humans are not capable
of experiencing and interpreting experience simultaneously, an infinitesimal
space and time open up between these two actions, specifically because the
nature of experience and the nature of interpretation are so very different. The
key here is that it is not just that we experience and interpret experiences, but
that value plays an integral role in how we proceed from experience to
interpretation.
Robert Pirsig supplies us with the fodder for an explanation of this. In his
quixotic pursuit of Quality in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, he
provides the understanding that Quality is the nexus of static and dynamic
Quality which occurs within the space and time between 'experience' and
'interpretation' described by différance. As he states in Zen...:
"...at the cutting edge of time, before an object can be distinguished, there
must be a kind of nonintellectual awareness, which he called awareness of
Quality. You can't be aware that you've seen a tree until after you've seen the
tree, and between the instant of vision and the instant of awareness there must
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be a time lag. We sometimes think of that time lag as unimportant. But there's no
justification for thinking that the time lag is unimportant

none whatsoever.

The past exists only in our memories, the future only in our plans. The
present is our only reality. The tree that you are aware of intellectually, because
of that small time lag, is always in the past and therefore is always unreal. Any
intellectually conceived object is always in the past and therefore unreal. Reality
is always the moment of vision before the intellectualization takes place. There is
no other reality. This pre-intellectual reality is what Phaedrus (Pirsig) felt he had
properly identified as Quality. Since all intellectually identifiable things must
emerge from this pre-intellectual reality, Quality is the parent, the source of all
subjects and objects." [ref. Pirsig01 p.221-222]
The key here is that Pirsig notes the same identical lag, or temporal /
spatial delay that Derrida cites as the impetus for différance -- and describes that
this period is occupied by Quality, but not just any Quality; a "pre-intellectual
reality". This in itself is a bit odd when you think of his definition of Quality in
Lila... as comprising the four main levels of inorganic, organic, social, and
intellectual Quality. This occurs when one notices that the Quality that occupies
the time lag is pre-intellectual, and yet Quality contains a subset of intellectual
Quality. Something is strange here.
What is strange is that in defining Quality over a period of twenty-five
years through two novels, Pirsig has missed this key distinction between preintellectual and intellectual Quality. And herein lies the key overlap with Derrida's
concept of the temporal and spatial delay of différance.
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Let us recall Derrida's unprovoked rebuttal regarding a pre-conceptual
presence, a presence prior to the act of signification: "...But can one not conceive
of a presence, and of a presence to itself of the subject before speech or signs, a
presence to itself of the subject in a silent and intuitive consciousness?" Recall
also that this question was rephrased as: Can a presence be conceived that
exists between the experience of an event and the subsequent interpretation of
that event? The answer is 'yes', a presence can be conceived that exists
between the experience and the interpretation of an event.
The key to this presence is that it cannot be conceived during the delay
between experience and interpretation, though this presence definitively exists.
This presence is made up of the pre-intellectual aspects of Quality thus the
inability for it to be conceived. It has been shown that there are numerous levels
of Quality that have nothing to do with intellectualism -- namely inorganic,
organic, and social Quality. These levels of Quality act as filters during the space
/ time lag before the moment of interpretation that follows experience. In Lila: An
Inquiry into Morals, Robert Pirsig cites a keen example of what truly occurs
during the space and time between experience and interpretation, wherein he
discusses the concept of a static filter. While travelling down the Hudson River in
his sailboat, collecting his thoughts for Lila... , he came across this very peculiar
experience:
"A few months back a static filtering had occurred that could have been
disastrous. It was in an Ohio port where he had come in out of a summer storm
on Lake Erie. He had just barely been able to sail to windward off the rocks
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through the night until he reached a harbor about twenty miles down the coast
from Cleveland.
When he got there and was safely in the lee of the jetty he went below and
grabbed a harbor chart and brought it up and held it, soaking wet, in the rain,
using the boat's spreader lights to read by while he steered past concrete
dividing walls, piers, harbor buoys and other markers until he found the yacht
basin and tied up at a berth.
He had slept exhausted for most of the next day, and when he woke up
and went outside it was afternoon. He asked someone how far it was to
Cleveland.
'You're in Cleveland,' he was told.
He couldn't believe it. The chart said he was in a harbor miles from
Cleveland.

•

Then he remembered the little "discrepancies" he had seen on the chart
when he came in. When a buoy had a "wrong" number on it he presumed it had
been changed since the chart was made. When a certain wall appeared that was
not shown, he assumed it had been built recently or maybe he hadn't come to it
yet and he wasn't quite where he thought he was. It never occurred to him to
think he was in a whole different harbor!
It was a parable for students of scientific objectivity. Wherever the chart
disagreed with his observations he rejected the observation and followed the
chart. Because of what his mind thought it knew, it had built up a static filter, an
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immune system, that was shutting out all information that did not fit. Seeing is not
believing. Believing is seeing." [ref. Pirsig02 p.335]
Essentially, what Pirsig describes here is a case where value intervenes
between experience and interpretation. It was of more value to Pirsig at this
point to feel like he was traveling the right way to Cleveland, than it was for him
to acknowledge that he was already in Cleveland --- so much so that it deformed
his interpretation of the experience at hand.
Recall Pirsig's summarization of Quality as a "pre-intellectual reality". [ref.
pirsig01 p.241] This is an incredibly important point. To say that Quality is preintellectual implies that it comes before intellect, which implies that it precedes
comprehension -- a valuable static level of intellectual Quality. In order for one to
comprehend an experience, that experience must be filtered through the
mechanisms of Quality into the intellect. Pirsig makes the point very clear in his
texts that conceptualizing itself is the enemy of Quality responses to experience -- and from time to time he warns that "all the classical talk about (Quality) isn't
Quality." [ref. Rodino01 p.53]
And here is a way out of the labyrinth of endless, circular, non-sensical
play of signification that Derrida confronts us with the deconstruction/différance
pair of hyperactive terms. The way out of the labyrinth of Derrida's endless play
of signification is not a simple set of directions but, with the understanding that
Quality operates between 'experience' and 'interpretation', there is a possibility of
intervention that did not exist before.
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If Quality is the ultimate mechanism of value, and if Quality operates
between experience and interpretation, then it follows that value can infect,
effect, and influence interpretation. Thus, the endless play of signification can be
affected by value. In just the same way that Pirsig's sense of value filtered out
the necessary information he needed to realize that he was no longer going to
Cleveland and was rather in Cleveland, value in general acts by limiting the
possibilities of the beginning of interpretation. Derrida's conception of the free
play of the signifier caught in the grips of deconstruction and différance fails to
recognize the filtering and limiting influence of value upon interpretation.
This distinction between Quality and talking about Quality in itself is the
final word on the complete separation between the mechanisms of experience
and those of interpretation --- essentially reinforcing Derrida's exhaustive study of
différance. Since conceptualizing about Quality is never Quality itself, there is a
delay between the experience of Quality and the interpretation of Quality. This,
however, says nothing about the space and time between experience and
interpretation exemplified by différance. It can still be maintained that value or
Quality works between experience and interpretation, especially with the help of
the 'Cleveland Harbor Effect'. The filtering of information between experience and
interpretation that occurred during Pirsig's approach to the harbor was a nonintellectual or pre-intellectual event. The information that was of value to Pirsig
(a.k.a. the Quality information) was all that he used in his interpretation of the
data.
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say this experience occurs during a fatal car accident. The model above labeled
(1) is the exact moment that the experience occurs: the moment of death, the
pain of impact of a head against a steering wheel, the instant of catching a the
glance from an oncoming driver, or the image of a speedometer pushing 80
m.p.h. ... whichever type of experience you prefer.

The model labeled (2) is a moment just after the experience, but before
the interpretation of the experience. This is the inorganic Quality phase of the
delay; the phase during which inorganic sensory information is transferred
between the participants of the experience. This inorganic information takes the
form of light waves, sound waves, instances of touch, smell, and taste.

Interference with any of this information will effect ultimately the interpretation of
the experience. For instance, if the windshield cracks upon impact, the visual
nature of the event becomes fractured by spidering safety glass. If an electrical
line is cut at impact, the sonic information from the radio will cease. Burying your
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face in the air freshener hanging from the rear view will force an excess of

Figure 4.5

The model labeled (3) is a moment after the experience and the inorganic
phase, but before the interpretation of the experience. This is the organic Quality
phase of the delay; the phase during which inorganic sensory information is
interiorized within the static organic patterns of the event. This organic
information is influenced by the organic Quality of the systems involved,

Interference with any of this information will effect ultimately the interpretation of
the experience. For instance, if the neurological system involved is faulty, the
inorganic sensory information may become altered during transit, or may not
transmit at all (as in the case of paralysis). If there is a biochemical deficiency in
the brain, inorganic sensory information may become exaggerated or diminished
in accordance. If blindness is involved, light waves may be subdued, or may not
reach the brain at all.
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The model labeled (4) is a moment after the experience, the inorganic,
and organic phases, but before the interpretation of the experience. This is the
social Quality phase of the delay; the phase during which organic sensory
information is interiorized within the static social patterns of the event. This
social information is influenced by the social Quality of the systems involved.
Interference with any of this information will ultimately effect the interpretation of
the experience. For instance, if impact has occurred with an inanimate, inorganic

system (a light-pole), or with an oncoming vehicle, awareness of the other will be
drastically different. If a small child is in the oncoming car, or your mother, or a
drunk driver then in each case the social Quality of the event encompasses a
much greater intensity than striking a light-pole. Depending upon how many
other cars become influenced by the accident, the social Quality will be increased
or decreased. Whether or not onlookers use their cellular phones may make the
difference between life and death. In addition, embedded 'social' patterns,
customs, and language effect the translation of information.
Notice here that the "Human Plane of Interpretation" falls just beyond the
'social' Quality phase, and just before the 'intellectual' Quality phase. This critical
plane begins the moment of intellectual 'interpretation'.
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The model labeled (5) is a moment after the experience, the inorganic,
organic, and social phases, immediately after the beginning of the interpretation
of the experience. This is the intellectual Quality phase that marks the end of the
pre-intellectual delay. Interference with any of this information will ultimately
effect the interpretation of the experience --- and during the intellectual Quality
phase, there is always interference to this information. Prior to this phase, all
intellectual information had been filtered by the inorganic, organic, and social
phases of the event, dictating the starting point of the intellectual interpretation of
the event. This filtered information is then analyzed by the mind and
comprehended; signifiers are tendered as signifieds, and meaning is established.
Let's look at these phases of Quality together in one chart. This chart
completes the description of the temporal and spatial delay between experience
and interpretation that was never taken up by Derrida himself when discussing
différance. Using Robert Pirsig's elaborate study of Quality, it was possible to

begin to understand that the pre-intellectual aspects of Quality are actively
distorting the data we encounter during the period of différance which follows any
discrete event, called "indifférance". Knowing that inorganic, organic and social
Quality are at work prior to any act of interpretation or conceptualization opens
up an entirely new field of theoretical inquiry in and around all applied schismatic
architectural discourse involving différance. This means that although highly
theoretical architects may focus exhaustively upon the underpinnings of their
projects, when these projects are finally realized in space and time, these three
levels of pre-intellectual Quality will always precede the interpretation of the
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theory behind the design. Thus, to focus all energies into the theoretical aspects
of a built design is to forego the opportunity to inform the pre-intellectual filtering
that begins the intellectual process of interpretation of any event.
Ultimately, though, the signification that takes place during the intellectual
Quality phase must be held accountable to the very mechanisms of différance
that designated the spatial and temporal delay which allowed for pre-intellectual
filtering by the inorganic, organic, and social Quality phases. In other words,
although the interpretation of the event begins with information that was filtered
by these inorganic, organic, and social Quality phases, with the meaning of the
event affected by these filters --- the chain of signification that continues from
there remains caught in the endless cycle of signified as sign as signified as
sign... ; once signs occupy the space of the intellect and are attempted to be
comprehended, they fall prey to the endless, nonsensical play of signification of
différance. This reinforces the idea that no highly theoretical architect will ever
be able to directly convey the meaning of their theoretical pursuits through
building; and any designer who attempt to do such while foregoing the inorganic,
organic, and social Quality of their building (since we cannot control these
aspects of the interpreter) is, again, forfeiting the opportunity to inform the preintellectual filtering that begins the intellectual process of interpretation of any
event.
In conclusion, all of this discussion tells us that the levels of Quality that
are at work in the space and time between experience and interpretation are the
non-intellectual levels: namely inorganic, organic and social Quality. Suddenly

66

these levels of Quality take on a level of precedence (both in a temporal and
hierarchical way) over intellectual Quality in a way that has never been
completely expressed before. It is not true that intellectual pursuits are in any
way, shape or form are higher than any other pursuits in life. And herein lies the
ultimate deconstruction of Pirsig's shift of Quality from that of value in Zen...: An
Inquiry into Values to that of moral in Lila: An Inquiry into Morals. Not only was
Pirsig's shift from value to morality rendered impotent due to its ideological
nature, but his decision to hierarchically place the intellectual as the supreme
level of Quality is incongruous with the results of his own detailed investigation
into Quality. Thus, Robert Pirsig's attempt to utilize Quality as a contemporary
moral fulcrum is undermined by itself.

ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL HALL: 26 Wall St., New York, NY 10013

Figure 5.2
67
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The obvious references to the Parthenon and the Pantheon made by the
designers of Federal Hall in lower Manhattan make it a rich piece for an example
of a semiological study of architecture. These references allow for complex
secondary and tertiary readings of the multi-valent set of signs that comprise the
structure itself.
Up until now, this thesis has worked very hard to define the essential new
term "indifference". Indifference is simply a set of theoretical lenses that function
within the moment of temporal deferral and spatial difference described in
Derrida's difference. It is clear up until now that both difference and indifference
are purely intellectual concepts, yet the key to indifference is that it is comprised
of multi-valent mechanisms that function on a pre-intellectual levels of inorganic

Quality, organic Quality, and social Quality. These levels, or lenses, are the only
mechanisms that exist to possibly effect the infinite regression that makes

difference such a deadly opponent to the pursuit of true semiological (and
ultimate philosophical) meaning. Once the interpretation of an experience is
underway, there is no way to effect the infinite semiological regression described
by Derrida in difference as the replacement of the sign's signified with that of
another sign. There can be no filtering of the vast amount of relatively senseless
information that comes after the delays of difference, but there is a way for the
mechanisms of difference to be effected by the lenses that make up the
inorganic, organic and social Quality of the both the signs and the readers of
those signs that comprise the experience. The idealized mechanisms of both

différance and indifférance with respect to semiology and philosophy will now be
explained through an analysis of my singular experience of the "reading" of the
architectural text that is "Federal Hall". It should be understood before reading
this example that I have restricted only to what I knew of the history of the
structure at each given moment in the reading of the signs that comprise the
structure.
This example of the mechanisms of indifférance is complex because nonintellectual or pre-intellectual means must be employed to elaborate upon of an
intellectual concept within in an intellectual language. Therefore the
representation of the experience of reading Federal Hall will undoubtedly be
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flawed and underexecuted. Also, my expertise in the fields of architecture,
architectural history, and architectural theory will add a considerable dimension
to this example, far beyond that of the layperson as experiencer. Only with these
concerns in mind will a reader of this thesis gain anything from a serious
representation of the experience of reading of an architectural text.

The Experience
Since my life has gone through some serious changes over the past few months,
I had gotten myself in a rhythm of visiting my close friend David at few times a
week to get out of my apartment in the middle of the week. I would take the

name has been changed.

subway over to David's 45 Wall St. apartment often, since there was much more
for us to do in his area of lower Manhattan than in my area of Jersey City, New
Jersey. It got to the point where I was walking by Federal Hall at 26 Wall St.
about four or five times a week, at various times of the day, and it always
seemed to catch my eye. I mean, it has such a prominent site on the corner of
Wall and Broad streets, right across from the New York Stock Exchange. And
that statue of George Washington... that commands some visual interest. But
the real draw was the blatant reference made on its exterior to the Parthenon in
Athens. This corner site in New York City was so incredibly different than that of
the Acropolis, that ancient "city on high" in Greece, and yet this did not seem to
phase the designers of this building at all. Obviously they were going for some

sort of scholarly reference when came to choosing the clothes for this building in
the 1830's. I mean, I know that during that period in American Architectural
History the buzz was the German's archeological findings of the ancient world,
and that led to a serious Neoclassical drive in terms of the style of U. S.
architecture, but Federal Hall was not like the other large buildings in the area
that seemed to work an ancient temple front somewhere in to the facade or the
roof of the structure. No, this was a replica of the shell of the Parthenon located
in the heart of lower Manhattan. This can be seen through the rest of the series
of photographs of Federal Hall that are located at the end of this section.
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What does that mean to me? Why would the founding fathers of the
United States enshroud the first capitol building of the country with an Ancient
Greek skin? I was taught in school that these kind of references are made to
give a foundation to the government based upon the concept of Greek
Democracy, even before American Democracy was truly in place. Since the
ancient Greeks built the Parthenon, and the ancient Greeks were the first culture
to create a working Democracy, then any reference made to the Parthenon
would reference that idea of Democracy. The same was done in Prussia, where
references to the same ancient structures was supposed to give that culture an
instant sense of credibility. That is what I have been taught to be the intended
meaning of this type of reference: to build upon the lineage of ancient Greek
Democracy. At the

Figure

same time, however, I know that the Parthenon was a religious structure. and yet
the Federal Building was never intended to be a religious institution -- it was
always determined to be a government building. Does this mean that our
founding fathers wanted us to revere the Federal Government with the same fear
and obedience that was required toward the God of the 1830's? But the
Parthenon was not erected to God (singular), but rather to the goddess Athena in
Greek Mythology. Does that mean that our founding fathers wanted to infuse
government with a new religious fervor, and that this copy of the Parthenon was
indeed cited based on a religious (governmental) text, similar to the way the
original site of the Parthenon was decided upon? I think here I am beginning to
stray from the intentions of our founding fathers. And yet these are all plausible
meanings that I can derive from the reference of Federal Hall to that of the Greek

Parthenon. What can I employ to critically corral these meanings into a serious
reading of the architecture of Federal Hall? Do I need a scholar of American
Architecture? A Park and Rec. tour of the now museumified Federal Hall? A trip
to Greece? To talk directly to the designers of the structure? What will end the
plurality of meaning that I am faced with here in reading this structure and help
me focus in on a reasonable set of intended meanings based on a serious
reading of this architectural text? Perhaps a trip inside the structure of Federal
Hall will help clarify things. As I said, this building is now a museum dedicated to
documentation of the previous uses of the building: as capitol building, customs
house, bank, etc. But there is also another blatant reference made to another
ancient culture, that of the Romans, as a scaled down copy of the interior of the
Pantheon makes up the majority of this space. Perhaps this too is a religious
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reference, this time to the pantheistic Roman mythologies. The dome over the
Corinthian columns is unmistakably based upon those of the Pantheon, aside
from the overall scale and the fact that the oculus in Federal Hall is covered with
glass. Or maybe the sign out front of the structure speaks the truth when it
states that this is a reference to the political and economic power of the Romans,
power that we here in the U.S. should emulate. But then is this truly a set of
multi-valent references, or just a motley melding of various ancient signs with no
clear intention. The Greco-Roman heritage is a clear one in history, but seems a
bit confused when the Parthenon and the Pantheon are conflated into a single
structure. And then there are the complete dismissals of reference altogether.
Take for instance the fact that there are glass windows in the entablature,
between the triglyphs, signifying an attic! How blasphemous is that? What does
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building with respect to government? And what about the fact that the structure is
inhabitable! Never could an individual enter a Greek temple unless you were the
high priest offering a human or animal sacrifice to the specific God the temple
was dedicated to. The inhabitation of the structure leads to the fact that the
interior walls are pushed out as far as possible to the exterior, engaging the
perimeter columns on both sides, rendering them essentially pilasters. And the
building being sited next to large buildings, even skyscrapers like the Trump
tower! What does that mean? This search for semiological and philosophical
meaning is becoming very confused.

1-igure 0.14

It seems that I am caught in a dilemma. I have been taught most of the signifieds
of these architectural signifiers over the many years of my architectural
education. And yet this plethora of information leaves me with less of a clear
idea of the true intentions of the authors of this architectural text than that of a
barely-informed tourist who takes the meaning of this structure right off the sign
in front of the front steps!!! My sense of the meaning of this structure is based
more on the power of the various forms of rhetoric that have gone into informing
the signifieds of these signifiers than on the factual information that I have dug up
on the subject. Do I value more the information of the nameless, faceless
Federal Hall museum curators or that of my professors that I have met and
interacted with socially, inside and outside of class? Do I value more the
congruities of the referential qualities of this structure with respect to the
Parthenon and the Pantheon, or the incongruities of their hybridization?
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It is clear that I am going to have to make inherent value judgements
about what has been presented to me in Federal Hall in order to arrive at a
succinct, plausible sense of meaning from the structure. I am going to have to
rely on other sources, and decide whether those sources are themselves
readings of value of this structure. Otherwise, the signifieds of meaning that I
have arrived at will continue to defer and differ to other signs and signifieds, as
Derrida has taught us through différance, until I can make absolutely no sense of
this analysis any longer.
The key here is that not only is the power of the rhetoric that I have been
introduced to surrounding the semiological and philosophical meaning of this
structure going to greatly effect the ultimate meaning that this structure holds for
me, but also the realities of the lenses that make up the inorganic, organic and
social Quality of the both the signs and the reader of those signs (myself) that
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comprise the events prior to the interpretation of the experience of reading this
architectural text. At the same time there were many factors at play before I
even began to interpret the semiological data before me at Federal Hall; factors
that dictated what I was able to see in terms of signs prior to interpreting them.
These factors are a part of indifférance, factors which function as lenses to
filter out information when a semiological interpretation an experience is
undertaken. Again, these three filters are the inorganic, organic and social
Quality of the reader and the signs that the reader has read. Examples of all
three lenses will now be attempted. Keep in mind that these are specifically preintellectual lenses, so intellectualizing about them me seem crude or
underdeveloped. Also understand that though Quality precedes the subject and
the object in an interaction, Quality does not exist independent of a subject and
an object. To talk about the "quality" of an object is of no interest to this thesis;
what is of interest is the sense of Quality described up until now, a Quality that is
metaphysical, not merely descriptive. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss
Quality with respect to individual parts of an interactive experience -- all
discussions on Quality must include the viewer and the viewed.

Inorganic Quality lens: My Particular Reading of Federal Hall
Federal Hall has a very high sense of inorganic Quality about it. The building is
superbly intact after 150+ years and appears to be quite resistant to natural
weathering and disasters. The building is only incongruous as a reference to the
works it is based upon, which is an intellectual incongruity. As a building, it
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functions very well on its own. Therefore, as a reader of Federal Hall, it is very
easy to learn about the building simply through its presence. There is no need
for extensive excavation or restoration in order to study it; it is not a ruin like the
Parthenon; and because it was so well designed and cared for, Federal Hall will
retain its very high sense of inorganic Quality for many years to come.

Organic Quality lens: My Particular Reading of Federal Hall

Federal Hall has a high sense of organic Quality about it. The Classical
sense of beauty that has been imported from Greece and Italy, copied directly
from two of the most iconic structures in the Western world, has been revered for
millennia for its symmetries, hierarchies, and sense of visual balance. The
organic quality of this type of aesthetic brings peace and harmony to the vast
majority of its viewers / inhabitants. This relatively static, singular aesthetic
would only aggravate a radical liberal member of the design world's supposed
avant garde, since it would run counter to their more dynamic, pluralistic
philosophies; but for the vast majority of the public, it retains a high sense of
organic Quality.

Social Quality lens: My Particular Reading of Federal Hall

Federal Hall has a very low sense of social Quality about it. During periods of
normal use, the structure was obviously off-limits to many a viewer / inhabitant.
During most of the time this building has been functional it was a government
building, and therefore was off limits to most, if not all, of the public. Now this is
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even worse, with the museumification of the space, as there are no users even to
interact with in the building. The national parks guard at the desk was the only
person there during nearly all of the investigations made on the premises, and he
only granted me the power to take as many photographs as I wanted and
directed me to the governmental pamphlets that supplied a watered-down
version of the history of the building. Basically, there is almost no way to learn
information about the building by interacting with people within its confines, which
is why it has such low social Quality.

How do these lenses function in the intellectualization of the building?

For the most part, the pre-intellectual conceptualization of Federal Hall is only
impeded by its low sense of social Quality. It is almost a requirement that a
structure based upon two of the most revered museums of the Western world
would one day too become a museum in its own right. The inability to interact
with users and see the building function for more than a bunch of outside viewers
severely impairs the ability of a reader to make a sound intellectual reading of the
overall structure. All that is left to interact with within the interior of the building is
a series of panels erected by the museum curators -- essentially a series of
textual and pictorial representations of how the building used to function from a
social perspective. These intellectualized representations of the social Quality of
the building are misleading in their own right, because they are gross
overgeneralizations of reality, and themselves fall into the immediate trap of
différance, functioning only on the level of intellectual Quality. On the levels of

84

inorganic and organic Quality, the structure does not inhibit the beginnings of an
intellectual reading of the structure -- in fact these lenses work well to facilitate a
serious critical analysis of the building by supplying undisturbed inorganic data
and subsequently a fine example of the organic aesthetic of the ancient Greeks
and Romans.

Conclusions

The main intention of this thesis was to grapple with Derrida's notion of difference
and finally wrestle the endless free-play of signification that it describes into
some sense of boundedness, as to release semiological meaning, knowledge
and understanding from its relentless grasp. In achieving this goal, a chain
reaction would begin that would free the discourse of applied schismatic
architectural theory from the post-structuralist vice of difference, opening up an
entirely new field of "value" and "Quality" based discourse.
This thesis uncovered a beautiful intersection between the critical work of
Robert M. Pirsig and Jacques Derrida: by reinscribing "Quality" within the space
of "value" rather than that of the "moral", and acknowledging its importance within
the mechanisms of différance, this thesis posits that there be new light shed on
the complex filtering aspects of Hindifférance", generally within the discourse
semiology and specifically within the field of applied schismatic architectural
theory.
We have seen how to navigate a way out of Derrida's haunt of difference
by acknowledging the fact that the intellectualization of signs is impossible under
the grip of this powerful concept, and therefore the only options that remain are
the critical analysis of the pre-intellectual aspects of the sign -- the socio-political,
biological, and inorganic aspects of "indifférance"..
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APPENDIX A:
THE IDEOLOGY OF QUALITY AS MORALITY
"The Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgments are essentially
assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the world, then
moral judgments are the fundamental ground-stuff of the world. It says that even
at the most fundamental level of the universe, static patterns of value and moral
judgment are identical." [ref. Pirsig02 p.156]
Since human evolution proceeded in order from "inorganic" to "organic" to
"social" and then to "intellectual" Quality, with each "static" level branched off
"dynamically" from of the previous level, Pirsig employs this ordering system as
the basis for his new morality. Thus, a hierarchy is established which places
"intellectual" above "social" Quality, "social" above "organic" Quality, and
"organic" above "inorganic" Quality much like his previous ladder analogy.
This ordering pattern is true in the sense of evolution, but becomes meaningless
forced upon when morality. Yet, Pirsig still goes on to say:
"...the Metaphysics of Quality supports this dominance of intellect over
society. It says intellect is a higher level of evolution than society; therefore, it is
a more moral level than society. It is better for an idea to destroy a society than it
is for a society to destroy an idea." [ref. Pirsig02 p.277]
and,
"...'Vice' is an example. In an evolutionary morality the meaning of vice is quite
clear. Vice is a conflict between biological quality and social quality. Things like
sex and booze and drugs and tobacco have a high biological quality, that is
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they feel good, but are harmful for social reasons. They take all of your
money. They break up your family. They threaten the stability of your community.
[ref. Pirsig02 p.163]
and,
"...It's out of this struggle between conflicting static patterns that the
concepts of good and evil arise. Thus, the evil of disease which the doctor is
absolutely morally committed to stop is not an evil at all within the germ's lower
static pattern of morality. The germ is making a moral effort to stave off its own
destruction by lower-level inorganic forces of evil. [ref. Pirsig02 p.163]
This shift from Quality as 'value' to Quality as 'morality' is ineffective, at
best. Pirsig converts the Metaphysics of Quality from a powerful analytical tool
into an ideological / theological act of judgment. In effect, he alters the essence
of Quality: instead of it remaining a vessel of value that contains its own
'erasure', Quality becomes the 'transcendental signified' of all interactions and
presencings.
But, Mark C. Taylor explains the systematic demise of the 'transcendental
signified' as a part of the "loss of God" that has occurred in the twentieth century
in his 1984 essay Erring: A Postmodern A/theology. In this essay Taylor
discusses the indelible link between "word" and the "Word of God". If a "word" is
a "sign", which is made up of a "signifier" and a "signified" (as Saussure
revealed), then the "signified" is the ultimate meaning of the word. In a
theological age, "...God, or His substitute, appears either overtly or covertly to be
the final meaning of the word. Put differently, God is, in effect, the
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'transcendental signified' that grounds the structure of signification. Since the
'sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth,' the 'age of the sign is
essentially theological.' " [ref. Derrida02]
This link between 'God' and 'transcendental signified 'is readily apparent,
but when seen in conjunction with the "death of God", "word" is left in a rather
precarious position. When the "sign" is viewed with respect to the "death of God"
that has permeated this twentieth century, the passing of the "One" also signals
the passing of the "transcendental signified" as well. Taylor completes this
analysis in saying:
"It should be clear that writing inscribes the disappearance of the
transcendental signified. In this way, scripture embodies and enacts the death of
God, even as the death of God opens and releases writing. The disappearance
of the transcendental signified closes the theological age of the sign and makes
possible the free play of a/theological writing."
So, where does all this discussion leave us? This is clear: Pirsig's attempt
to replace "Quality" as the "transcendental signified" is a lost attempt at
reinscribing writing into a theological / ideological state. "Quality" is not the
mystical, undefinable entity that he claims it is. "Quality" has a definition in the
dictionary, just as limited and in play as any other word. Just because Pirsig
capitalized the word does not give it special privileges. "Quality" is a special
word, but in the end it is nothing more than a shell or a husk that delimits a space
of meaningful "play-on-words". This 'meaningful space' contained within Pirsig's
term "Quality" (which will continued to be used to designate this space, for lack of
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a better term) is an incredible nexus of static and dynamic patterns. Pirsig states
himself that these patterns are in a state of continuous evolution. "Quality" is
ultimately a temporal and spatial vessel of 'value', and nothing more. Taylor
reinforces this in stating: "the/A word is nothing in itself; it is a play within a play,
a play that is forever an interplay." [ref. Taylor01] If the/A word is in play, then any
particular instance of a word must also be in 'play'; particularly "Quality".
Creating an ideology around a term in this day and age is impossible.
T.J. Clark, in his theoretical introduction to The Painting of Modern Life:
Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers, sets forth a fine description of the
pitfalls of theory and/or discourse as ideology:
...The sign of an ideology is a kind of inertness in discourse: a fixed
pattern of imagery and belief, a syntax which seems obligatory, a set of permitted
modes of seeing and saying; each with its own structure of closure and
disclosure, its own horizons, its way of providing certain perceptions and
rendering others unthinkable, aberrant, or extreme. And these things are done ...
as it were, surreptitiously. Which is to say that ideologies, like any forms of
knowledge, are constructs..." [ref. Clark01]
Throughout Lila, Robert Pirsig works extremely hard to craft his personal
interpretation of "Quality" into a "better" or "higher quality" notion than those that
have come before him. He toils in order to release "Quality" from the grips of
various "Inorganic", "Biological", "Social", and "Intellectual" patterns that already
exist, as this act of liberation stands as the ultimate goal of his "Metaphysics of
Quality." Inconsistently, rather than set "Quality" free, Pirsig instead shackles
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"Quality" to the leg of another staid, hierarchical sense of morality. This attempt
at liberating "Quality" has in fact has just re-inscribed the term in another, more
covert cage, in effect placing ideological concerns upon the undefinable "space"
of experience. Another look to T.J. Clark continues the description of the
cancerous effect of ideology in the world of discourse:
"...one ought to beware of a notion of ideology which conceives it merely
as a set of images, ideas, and "mistakes," for its action on and in the process of
representation is different from this: it is more internal, more interminable.
Rather, an ideology is a set of limits to discourse; a set of resistances,
repetitions, kinds of circularity. It is that which closes speech against
consciousness of itself as production, as process, as practice, as subsistence
and contingency. And of necessity this work of deletion is never done: it would
hardly make sense to think of it finished."
This is a far cry from Pirsig's own notions of 'dynamic' Quality: "Dynamic
Quality is not structured and yet it is not chaotic. It is value that cannot be
contained by static patterns." If Quality is made up of a symbiotic coupling of the
seemingly opposing terms of 'static' and 'dynamic', them imposing morality, in
any sense, upon Quality restricts it from continuing to exist as a nexus of 'static'
and 'dynamic' patterning.
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